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CASE NOTES
the applicable statute of limitations, two factors must be present:
(1) Fraudulent concealment; (2) nondiscovery, that is, absence of
facts that would put a party upon notice of the cause of action.
Mere ignorance of the injury complained of, or of the facts consti-
tuting such injury, will not prevent the running of the statute as
The plaintiff would be required to allege fraudulent concealment in the
pleadings and "must prove both affirmative acts of concealment on the part
of defendant and reasonable grounds for his own failure to penetrate the de-
ception."24 This basic procedure plus additional equitable rules on both
sides should result in a workable standard. In no event should a result be
reached whereby the wrongdoer is made secure from liability by fraudulently
concealing the cause of action. It is obvious that many companies seem to
think they have found a "loophole" in section 4B. This "loophole" has been
filled by the federal courts in previous cases, 35 and the present litigation does
not reveal any compelling reasons which prevent the application of the
fraudulent concealment doctrine to this supposed gap in the law. On the
other hand, there remains a possible gap in the law which, as previously
stated, appears not to be covered by Kansas City. In the self-concealing
conspiracy there may be no affirmative conduct by the wrongdoer, in which
case the exception to the running of the statute may not be applied. Whether
this gap will be closed is left to future case law.
EDWARD BOGRAD
Bankruptcy—Chapter XIII—Confirmation of Extension Plan within
Six Years of Previous Plan.—In re Holmes.'—In a Chapter XIII proceed-
ing the debtor sought confirmation of an extension plan which would give
him more time to repay his debts. The district court affirmed an order of
the Referee in Bankruptcy dismissing the debtor's petition on the ground
that section 14c(5) of Chapter 111 2 taken together with section 656a(3) of
Chapter X1113 operated as a bar to confirmation of an extension plan where
33 Id. at 752.
34 Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The
Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 29, 50 (1962).
35 Bailey v. Glover, supra note 10, and cases cited, supra note 9.
1 309 F.2d 748 (10th Cir, 1962).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 52 Stat, 850 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32c (1958)
provides:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has-
. . . (5) in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior
to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy . .. been granted a
discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition
or a wage earners' plan by way of a composition confirmed under this
title . . . .
3 Bankruptcy Act § 656a, 52 Stat. 935 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1056a (1958) provides:
The Court shall confirm a plan if satisfied that-
. .. (4) the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to per-
form any of the duties which would be a bar to the discharge of the bank-
rupt . . . .
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the debtor had availed himself of similar relief within a six year period. On
appeal the district court ruling was reversed. HELD: The bar of section
14c(5) was not intended to apply to those seeking extensions of time in a
Chapter XIII proceeding (wage-earner plan), regardless of resort to a similar
plan within six years.
Prior to the decision in the instant case, the cases dealing with this
same issue had reached contrary conclusions. In re Bingham4 had denied
confirmation of a plan on the ground that Congress' intent in enacting section
14c(5) explicitly states that no discharge shall be granted if a wage-earner
but also to prevent the growth of a class of habitual users of wage-earner
plans. The court reasoned that unless section 14c(5) was so interpreted,
abusive use of Chapter XIII relief would result.
Another district court opinion, In re Autry,5
 reached an opposite result,
thereby setting the stage for the case at hand. Emphasizing that section
14c(5) explicitly states that no discharge shall be granted if a wage-earner
plan by way of a composition has been confirmed within six years, the Autry
court granted confirmation of the debtor's plan since the plan was for an
extension of time only.° The court, interestingly enough, did not know
whether the earlier plan in Bingham was an extension or a composition, and
sought to reconcile the cases by assuming that the first plan in Bingham
involved the latter.?
The court of appeals in the instant case, faced with this division, re-
solved the conflict by overruling Bingham, emphasizing that extension plans
do not come "within the letter or the spirit of the bar in Section 14, sub. c (5)."
It is submitted that the result reached in Holmes is unquestionably cor-
rect. Confirmation of a plan under Chapter XIII will be granted where the
court finds that "the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed
to perform any of the duties which would be a bar to the discharge of the
bankrupt." Section 14c(5) states the grounds for denial of a discharge in
ordinary bankruptcy° and it is at once obvious that the statute is "noticeably
silent with respect to extensions of time." 1° A literal reading of section
14c(5) reveals that it was proper for the court to confirm the subsequent
extension plan.
Rather than rest the decision on this narrow ground, the court went
further by remarking that wage-earner extension plans. do not fall within
the spirit of 14c(5). Support for this conclusion can be found in the fact
that the fundamental aim of Chapter XIII is to provide a system under
4 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kan. 1960).
5
 204 F. Supp. 820 (D. Kan. 1962).
6
 Id. at 821.
7
 Ibid. Failure to disclose the precise facts involved in the Bingham case generated
considerable confusion as to whether the earlier plan was an extension or a composition.
The court in the instant case makes it clear that an extension plan was involved in
Bingham and, therefore, in conflict with Autry.
8 309 F.2d at 749.
9 Supra note 2.
10
 Examination of the legislative history of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840 (1938),
points out that Congress recognized the distinction between compositions and extensions
and deliberately included only the former within section 14c(5). See generally It Rep.
No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1937).
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which the debtor who finds himself in financial difficulties can pay his obliga-
tions, either in full or in part, out of his future earnings. The virtue of such
a scheme lies not only in the fact that in most instances the debtor is able
to avert the stigma of bankruptcy, which would in all probability result as
his creditors became more and more insistent, but also in the fact that credi-
tors themselves are generally repaid in full. 11 Public policy would, therefore,
appear to dictate that the courts take a liberal view toward plans whose pur-
pose is the financial rehabilitation of the wage earner, since under an exten-
sion plan "The debtor seeks to pay debts—not to discharge them. 7"2 The court
in Holmes endorses these policy considerations in its ruling that extension
plans do not fall within the "spirit" of section 14c(5).
Where the debtor has received a discharge in bankruptcy or has had a
wage-earner plan by way of composition confirmed within a six year period,
it would appear at first that section 14c(5) taken together with section
656a(3) would bar confirmation of a petition for a subsequent plan whether
by way of extension or composition. The cases dealing with this problem are
split," the majority taking the view that the purposes behind section 14c(5)
are so inconsistent with the aims of Chapter XIII relief that the former is
inapplicable by virtue of section 602,14 and this line of reasoning is cited with
approval by the court in the instant case.
It is submitted that the conclusions reached in the majority of cases are
correct, and when these rulings are read in conjunction with the decisions
reached in the instant case and in In re Autry, a trend in favor of wider
usage of Chapter XIII proceedings is clearly discernible."
EDWARD H. LONDON
11 See discussion in note 15 infra of the striking success achieved under Chapter
XIII, where it is pointed out that 98% of the total debts involved in the cases closed in
fiscal 1960 were repaid.
12 In re Sharp, 205 F. Stipp, 786, 789 (ND. Mo. 1962).
13 In re Mahalcy, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (confirmation approved); In
re Sharp, supra note 13, (confirmation approved); In re Schlageter, 37 Ref. J. 24 (D.N.J.
1963) (confirmation denied).
14 Bankruptcy Act 602, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 	 1002 (1958) states that
"the provisions of Chapter 1 to VII inclusive, of this act, shall, insofar as they are not
inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter, apply in proceedings under
this Chapter. . . ."
15 Examination of the Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Pro-
ceedings, at 209-10 (September 20-21, 1961) reveals that it is not surprising that the
courts have sought to encourage more frequent resort to Chapter XIII relief. Between
1950 and 1960 the number of cases filed under the Bankruptcy Act increased from ap-
proximately 34,000 to 110,034 and to 146,643 by the end of 1961. Nearly 90% of the
total bankruptcies filed in 1960-61 involved non-business groups, i.e., wage earners, (id.
at 211) and it is at once clear that striking success has been achieved in Chapter XIII
proceedings.
During the fiscal year 1960, the unpaid liabilities scheduled in the 63,086 straight
bankruptcy cases closed during the year were $469,865,567. During the same
period the debts affected in the 5,920 Chapter XIII cases completed were
$5,277,737, of which $5,168,251, or 98% was paid to creditors. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Id. at 91.
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